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John Y. Campbell and Martin Feldstein
The increasing life expectancy in the United States and in other industrial
countries is creating a major problem for traditional unfunded social secu-
rity pension programs. In such pay-as-you-go programs, the cost of pro-
viding any level of beneﬁts varies directly with the ratio of retirees to em-
ployees. While the tendency toward earlier and earlier retirement that is
encouraged by the social security rules in many countries is exacerbating
this problem (Gruber and Wise 1998), the sharp increase in the ratio of
the aged to those of working age will increase the cost of pay-as-you-go
programs very substantially even if age-speciﬁc retirement rates stabilize.
The U.S. social security actuaries now project that the cost of providing
the beneﬁts implied by the current social security formula will rise from
about 12 percent of covered payroll earnings now to more than 17 percent
by 2030 and to nearly 20 percent by 2070.
The high cost to taxpayers of obtaining beneﬁts in a pay-as-you-go sys-
tem reﬂects the relatively low implicit rate of return that participants earn
on the taxes paid in any unfunded system. As Paul Samuelson showed in
his famous 1958 paper, the implicit rate of return on the tax “contribu-
tions” in an unfunded pay-as-you-go system is equal to the rate of growth
of the tax base. Since the U.S. system is ﬁnanced by a tax on cash wages,
it is the future growth of aggregate cash wages that determines the rate of
return. The social security actuaries base their calculations of the required
future rise in tax rates on the assumption that future reductions in the
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1growth rate of the population will limit this implicit real rate of return to
less than 2 percent a year.
Although the U.S. social security system is essentially a pay-as-you-go
program in which each year’s tax receipts are used to pay the beneﬁts of
concurrent retirees, there is also a trust fund that is invested in government
bonds. The rate of return on these bonds aﬀects the amount that is avail-
able to pay annual beneﬁts and therefore aﬀects the overall rate of return
that participants receive on the taxes that they pay. However, these interest
payments are simply a transfer between government accounts. They are
therefore of no aggregate economic signiﬁcance, although they are capable
of raising the return on payroll-tax payments at the expense of income-
tax payments. But, since the trust fund is relatively small (only about two
years’ worth of beneﬁts and less than 10 percent of the present value of
the obligations of the social security program), the rate of return on the
trust fund has very little eﬀect on the overall implicit rate of return that
participants receive on their social security taxes. As a practical matter,
the implicit rate of return is determined by the rate of growth of the social
security tax base, and the system eﬀectively operates on a pay-as-you-
go basis.
There are in principle three basic ways that can be used to deal with the
problem of the increasing cost of a pay-as-you-go system: beneﬁt cuts, tax
increases, and prefunding. These approaches could be used either alone
or in combination with each other. Some experts propose cutting future
beneﬁts so that future tax rates do not have to rise. These beneﬁt cuts
might take the form of changes within the existing structure of social secu-
rity beneﬁts (increasing the age of retirement, modifying the current post-
retirement inﬂation adjustment, or other, more obscure alterations in
rules) or of more fundamental shifts from the existing beneﬁt structure to
a uniform beneﬁt system. A second group of proposals would maintain
beneﬁts, requiring taxes to rise substantially in the future. Finally, since
neither large beneﬁt cuts nor large tax increases are politically appealing,
the forthcoming demographic shift has generated substantial interest in
the idea of prefunding future beneﬁts by setting aside resources now
(through reduced beneﬁts, increased revenue, or transfers from existing
funds that would otherwise be used to ﬁnance either additional govern-
ment spending or tax reductions) and investing those funds either collec-
tively or through individual accounts. Although there are many variations
of the prefunding proposal, their common feature is increasing national
saving and, therefore, the nation’s capital stock. The additional national
income that would result from the increased capital would be earmarked
to ﬁnance future retirement consumption, making it possible to maintain
beneﬁts without raising taxes.
The idea of prefunding social security beneﬁts was rejected for a long
time on the grounds that the transition generation would have to “pay
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beneﬁts of those who are already retired while also saving for their own
retirement. With the pay-as-you-go tax now at more than 12 percent of
wage income, this “double burden” suggested to some critics that employ-
ees in the transition generation might be called on to pay as much as 24
percent of their wages. Not surprisingly, such a plan was rejected as basi-
cally unfair, politically impossible, or both.
Fortunately, the extra cost to the transition generation is much smaller
than the critics feared. Because the rate of return on real saving is much
higher than the implicit rate of return in the pay-as-you-go system, the
amount of saving required to fund any given amount of future beneﬁts is
much less than the corresponding pay-as-you-go tax rate. Moreover, since
during the transition phase retirees would receive some beneﬁts from the
funded part of the system, the level of the pay-as-you-go beneﬁts (and
therefore of the pay-as-you-go tax) could be gradually reduced during the
transition. Feldstein and Samwick (1997, 1998b) showed that a transition
from the existing pay-as-you-go system to a pure funded deﬁned-
contribution system could be achieved without any reduction in current
or future beneﬁts and without increasing the combined amounts of the
pay-as-you-go tax and the mandatory saving by more than 2 percent of
wage income, that is, from the current 12.4 percent payroll tax to a maxi-
mum of 14.4 percent despite the increasing aging of the population. More-
over, after a relatively few years, the declining cost of the pay-as-you-go
system that results as funded beneﬁts begin to replace the pay-as-you-go
beneﬁts means that the combined amount that individuals would be re-
quired to pay (as payroll taxes plus retirement-account saving) would actu-
ally be less than the initial 12.4 percent payroll tax in spite of the increase
in aggregate beneﬁts as the population ages.
An alternative transition to a mixed system in which investment-based
beneﬁts substitute for the increase in the pay-as-you-go tax, that is, in
which the current beneﬁt rules are maintained permanently while the pay-
roll tax remains unchanged at 12.4 percent of payroll as the population
ages, could also be achieved with no more than an additional 2 percent
of payroll (see Feldstein and Samwick 1998a; 1999). The economic studies
presented at a 1996 NBER conference (Feldstein 1998) explore other as-
pects of the transition to a prefunded social security system and discuss
how the shift to such an investment-based system was achieved in a variety
of diﬀerent economies around the world.
The fact that a transition to a retirement system that is wholly or partly
investment based is feasible does not imply the desirability of such a pol-
icy. At a minimum, that depends on the rate of return that is earned on
the investments and the eﬀect of the shift to an investment-based system
on the excess burdens of the tax system that is used to ﬁnance retirement
beneﬁts (for a discussion of these issues, see Feldstein and Samwick
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pends on three key economic issues as well as on the broader questions
about social norms and about the appropriate role of the state. The three
issues that must be addressed are the administrative costs of a funded
system, the distributional eﬀects of shifting from a pay-as-you-go system
to an investment-based system, and the market risks associated with any
investment-based system.
Each of these issues is the subject of a separate part of the overall cur-
rent NBER project on social security reform. John Shoven has organized
a study of the administrative costs and brought together a group of experts
with practical experience to discuss the issue; their analysis is presented in
Shoven (2000). Feldstein and Liebman (forthcoming) have organized a
project that compares the distributional eﬀects of the current social se-
curity pension system with the distributional eﬀects of alternative
investment-based systems. The current volume presents papers dealing
with the risk aspects of social security reform.
Each of the three approaches to the cost problem posed by the projected
demographic change—reducing beneﬁts, raising taxes, and shifting to
some form of investment-based system—involves risks for either future
taxpayers or future beneﬁciaries, or both. Although investment-based
plans introduce a new form of risk—the risk of volatility in the market
prices of investment assets—that is not present in pay-as-you-go systems,
even those plans that would continue to rely exclusively on the traditional
pay-as-you-go system imply important risks to future beneﬁciaries or re-
tirees.
Cutting future beneﬁts as the population ages in a way that keeps the
tax rate unchanged inevitably means not only that future beneﬁts would
be lower than they would be under current rules but also that those bene-
ﬁts would be much more uncertain, depending on such things as the lon-
gevity of the future retirees and the level of future wages. Maintaining
beneﬁts at the same future levels as they would be under current law not
only raises the expected level of future tax rates but also imposes addi-
tional risks on future taxpayers. Future tax rates must rise by more than
the expected amount if retirees generally live longer or if the rate of growth
of wage rates is lower than currently projected. Retirees and taxpayers are
also subject to the political risk that future administrations might change
the rules, either reducing beneﬁts or increasing taxes.
Critics of investment-based plans have nevertheless emphasized that,
because they involve investing in private stocks and bonds, such plans are
risky, especially if individuals own the ﬁnancial assets instead of investing
them in a common government fund that is used to ﬁnance deﬁned bene-
ﬁts. If part or all of future social security beneﬁts are converted from an
explicit deﬁned-beneﬁt plan provided by the government to some form
of deﬁned-contribution system based on individual investment accounts,
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of stocks and bonds. The extent of this risk can be reduced by using a
mixture of deﬁned-beneﬁt and deﬁned-contribution plans, instead of just
a pure investment-based deﬁned-contribution plan, or by providing some
kind of conditional pay-as-you-go beneﬁt that varies inversely with the
performance of the market. In the limit, the government can do the in-
vesting in a government fund and provide a deﬁned beneﬁt, thus placing
all the market risk on future taxpayers.
A primary purpose of this volume is to assess the magnitude of the risks
born by retirees and taxpayers in alternative investment-based systems.
The papers discuss issues of the measurement of risk and of how to model
the risk that would be borne in diﬀerent systems.
In thinking about the individual papers, it is important to bear in mind
that the basic rationale for an investment-based system is not the increase
in ﬁnancial return that would be achieved by shifting the existing social
security trust fund to a mixture of private stocks and bonds. The beneﬁt
of an investment-based system is that it involves an increase in national
saving and therefore in the national capital stock. The explicit return on
that increased capital stock is the source of payments for some or all of
future social security beneﬁts. The return on that increased capital is sub-
stantially higher than the implicit rate of return in the pay-as-you-go sys-
tem. Although general equilibrium considerations imply that the rise in
the capital stock would eventually reduce the real return to capital, calcu-
lations indicate that the decline in the return is small relative to the diﬀer-
ence between the return on capital and the implicit return in the pay-as-
you-go system. The issue, moreover, is not the uncertainty of the rate of
return to the nation as a whole—that is, the uncertain pretax real marginal
product of capital—but the riskiness of the return that must be borne by
future retirees and taxpayers because the increased national investment is
ﬁnanced through private securities that are subject to substantial price
ﬂuctuations.
Each reader must judge the evidence of this trade-oﬀ for himself or
herself. Our judgment is that the risks are moderate relative to the im-
proved return and to the ability of an investment-based system to adapt
to diﬀerences in individual preferences and conditions. It is possible,
moreover, to modify the basic investment-based plans in ways (explored
in some of the papers in this volume) that permit reducing the risk that
must be borne by retirees while keeping the risk to taxpayers quite mod-
erate.
Before turning to the individual papers, we now provide a very brief
summary of their ﬁndings and how they relate to each other.
The strong recent performance of the U.S. equity market has increased
interest in proposals to shift some of the social security trust funds from
long-term government bonds to stocks. In chapter 1, Thomas E. MaCurdy
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social security system but reallocate its investments in this way. The two
proposals, the “maintain-beneﬁts” option of the 1994–96 Advisory Coun-
cil on Social Security and the plan recently put forward by Henry Aaron
and Robert Reischauer, diﬀer in details, but both rely heavily on the equity
premium—the average excess return on stocks over bonds—to reduce the
seventy-ﬁve-year actuarial deﬁcit of the social security system. MaCurdy
and Shoven argue that these proposals are fatally ﬂawed because they seek
to exploit the equity premium without properly considering the invest-
ment risk associated with it. Even if social security equity investments
outperform bond investments on average, there is a substantial risk that
they will fail to do so over a ten- or twenty-year horizon. For example, a
bootstrap analysis—drawing real stock returns randomly from realiza-
tions that actually occurred during the period 1927–97—shows that, about
25 percent of the time, equity investments underperform twenty-year
inﬂation-indexed bonds yielding 3.5 percent.
Martin Feldstein, Elena Ranguelova, and Andrew Samwick (chap. 2)
explore the eﬀects of investment risk on a proposal for prefunding social
security put forward in earlier work by Feldstein and Samwick. Feldstein
and Samwick examine the eﬀect of adding modest contributions to per-
sonal retirement accounts (PRAs)—initially set at 3 percent of earnings.
Over a seventy-ﬁve-year transition period, as PRA savings accumulate,
payroll taxes could decline to zero, and the PRA contribution rate could
rise slightly to a steady-state 4.25 percent level. Feldstein, Ranguelova,
and Samwick also consider a partial transition in which the payroll tax
remains at its current level in the steady state. They assume that the PRA
portfolio is invested 60 percent in equities and 40 percent in corporate
bonds. They suggest that investment risk in this portfolio can be handled
by a combination of a higher PRA contribution rate, to shift the distribu-
tion of retirement beneﬁts upward, and a government guarantee that total
beneﬁts under the new system will be at least as large as those under the
current system. In such a system, the probability that the government will
havetomakegoodonitsguaranteeisrelativelysmall,andtheexpectedsize
of the government guarantee payment, if one must be made, is also small.
Kent Smetters (chap. 3) adopts a diﬀerent perspective on government
minimum-beneﬁt guarantees in investment-based social security systems.
He argues that market prices should be used to evaluate the costs of such
guarantees. The guarantees are equivalent to put options—social security
participants are eﬀectively granted options to put, or sell, their invest-
ments to the government at minimum prices—and option pricing theory
can therefore be used to value them. Using this approach, Smetters ﬁnds
signiﬁcant costs even for guarantees that are extremely unlikely to be acti-
vated. The reason is that the guarantees pay oﬀ in bad states of the world
with low stock prices, and the large equity premium implies that dollars
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that increasing the PRA contribution rate is an ineﬃcient way to address
the problem because it increases beneﬁts in good states of the world as
well as in bad states. He proposes instead that higher PRA contributions
should be used in eﬀect to buy put options on behalf of social security
participants. Such a policy diﬀers from an increased PRA contribution
rate in that it increases payments to participants only if stock returns turn
out to be low, and it diﬀers from a pure guarantee in that participants are
asked to buy their put options rather than receiving them as a transfer
from the government.
An important question is whether one can use existing market prices to
value changes in the social security system. If markets are incomplete, this
may not be appropriate because a nonmarginal change in the system can
alter market prices. Several other papers in this volume systematically
explore the eﬀects of market incompleteness, using the overlapping-
generations model as a common framework.
Antonio Rangel and Richard Zeckhauser (chap. 4) consider an overlap-
ping-generations model with randomness in both total endowments and
the distribution of endowments between generations. Their model makes
the standard simplifying assumption that each generation lives only two
periods and that only two generations are therefore alive at any one time.
In this setting, a long-lived asset can facilitate intergenerational risk shar-
ing by inducing young generations to pay old generations for their claims
to the asset. Unfortunately, this market mechanism breaks down when
eﬃcient risk sharing requires the old to make payments to the young. In
principle, this problem can be avoided by voluntary-contribution schemes
sustained by self-fulﬁlling expectations or by government intergenera-
tional transfers. Rangel and Zeckhauser argue, however, that voluntary-
contribution schemes are unlikely to work in practice and that eﬃcient
government intergenerational transfers may be incompatible with a demo-
cratic political system since future generations cannot vote to express their
interests. Thus, the authors are skeptical about the possibility of sharing
risks eﬃciently among generations. A qualiﬁcation, however, is that both
market and political risk-sharing schemes are likely to work better when
generations live more than two periods so that each generation overlaps
and can share risks with several others.
Andrew Abel (chap. 5) takes as given the existence of a deﬁned-beneﬁt
pension system in which a social security trust fund is accumulated as a
buﬀer between payroll-tax receipts and pension expenses of the system.
He uses the overlapping-generations framework to explore the eﬀects of
shifting the trust fund from riskless bonds to risky equities. In equilibrium,
the trust fund can buy equities only if private investors are willing to sell
them. Since today’s private investors do not themselves bear the risks of
the trust fund portfolio (their pension beneﬁts are ﬁxed, so the trust fund
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only if the equity premium declines. Abel assumes that the absolute return
on equities is ﬁxed by the marginal productivity of capital, so the decline
in the equity premium is accomplished by a rise in the riskless interest
rate. This, in turn, induces private investors to accumulate capital more
rapidly in the short run and, for plausible parameter values, in the long
run as well. Abel thus builds a case that investment of the social security
trust fund in equities would be good for capital accumulation and eco-
nomic growth. The eﬀect is quite small in an almost pure pay-as-you-go
system of the sort the United States has today but would be larger in a
prefunded system with a more substantial trust fund.
Henning Bohn (chap. 6) uses the overlapping-generations framework to
consider a diﬀerent type of risk, the demographic risk that a generation
will be unexpectedly large or small. It is often argued that deﬁned-beneﬁt
pay-as-you-go retirement systems handle such risks poorly because a
small generation that follows a large generation (like the “baby-bust” gen-
eration following the “baby-boom” generation) faces high payroll taxes to
pay for the ﬁxed beneﬁts of relatively numerous retirees. Bohn points out
that this argument ignores a countervailing eﬀect. In a closed economy, a
large generation tends to drive down the marginal product of labor and
therefore receives relatively low wages; conversely, a small generation tends
to receive high wages. Bohn argues that a deﬁned-beneﬁt pay-as-you-go
pension system helps generations share this risk more eﬃciently than
deﬁned-contribution or privatized systems. He also considers other types
of demographic shocks, including anticipated future demographic changes
and shocks to the life span of an existing generation. Results here depend
more sensitively on particular assumptions, but Bohn argues that eﬃcient
risk sharing often requires the adjustment of current social security bene-
ﬁts in response to news about future demographic trends.
Existing retirement systems around the world are often described as
deﬁned-beneﬁt systems since retirement beneﬁts are deﬁned by law. How-
ever, this ignores the fact that the systems are frequently reformed, with
large eﬀects on beneﬁts. John McHale (chap. 7) undertakes a systematic
empirical study of beneﬁt reforms in the G7 countries during the last ﬁf-
teen years. He ﬁnds that projections of rising costs under current law fre-
quently provoke reforms that substantially reduce the beneﬁts promised
to middle-aged and younger workers. However, the beneﬁts of citizens
who are already retired or are near retirement are typically protected. This
contrasts with Bohn’s ﬁnding that eﬃcient risk sharing requires adjust-
ments of current beneﬁts in response to demographic information. Mc-
Hale conjectures that there is a large political cost to changing retirement
beneﬁts that had already been promised and are currently payable.
The remaining papers in the volume take a microeconomic perspective.
They use expected-utility theory, in the context of ﬁnancial investment
8 John Y. Campbell and Martin Feldsteinover the life cycle, to compare alternative portfolio strategies during work-
ing life and in retirement.
Zvi Bodie (chap. 8) argues that there is considerable appeal to a system
in which investors share the upside potential of risky ﬁnancial assets, such
as equities, but also have a guaranteed minimum level of retirement bene-
ﬁt. Such a system might be justiﬁed by investors’ own demands for a min-
imum acceptable level of retirement consumption or by public policy
concerns that some people are unable to save adequately or invest compe-
tently on their own behalf. Bodie points out that this pattern of beneﬁts
need not be ﬁnanced through pay-as-you-go payroll taxation or through
a privatized system with a government minimum-beneﬁt guarantee. In-
stead, it can be provided privately through pension plans that hold a mix
of inﬂation-indexed bonds and call options on equities or that trade dy-
namically in the equity market to achieve the same pattern of payoﬀs.
One of the important functions of a retirement system is the provision
of annuities to insure retirees against the risk of unusual longevity. A natu-
ral benchmark, comparable to the current social security system, is a real
annuity that provides a ﬁxed real stream of income during an investor’s
lifetime. Jeﬀrey R. Brown, Olivia S. Mitchell, and James M. Poterba (chap.
9) ask whether real annuities can be provided within a privatized system.
They argue that, despite extremely limited current availability in the
United States (almost all private ﬁxed annuities make ﬁxed nominal pay-
ments, not ﬁxed real payments), experience in the United Kingdom sug-
gests that private markets can provide real annuities at reasonable cost.
Brown, Mitchell, and Poterba also argue that only extremely risk-averse
investors should hold pure real annuities; most investors should be willing
to take on some degree of equity risk in exchange for the higher returns
that have historically been available in the equity market.
Marianne Baxter and Robert G. King (chap. 10) broaden the menu of
risky assets to include international equities as well as domestic equities.
They show that international equities provide signiﬁcant diversiﬁcation
beneﬁts and should be very attractive to retired investors who are currently
holding either the real annuity provided by social security or a risky port-
folio of domestic assets. Baxter and King also consider the demand for
international assets by younger investors who are currently working. They
argue that these investors have a nontraded asset—human capital—that
is more highly correlated with domestic ﬁnancial assets than with interna-
tional ﬁnancial assets. Thus, younger investors gain even more than older
investors do from the ability to invest internationally.
John Y. Campbell, Joa ˜o F. Cocco, Francisco J. Gomes, and Pascal J.
Maenhout (chap. 11) undertake a more detailed study of the demand for
ﬁnancial assets by working investors. They calibrate a model of optimal
portfolio choice over the life cycle, using realistic estimates of the age pro-
ﬁle of income, its overall risk, and its correlation with ﬁnancial asset re-
Introduction 9turns for diﬀerent demographic groups. Households are assumed to be
constrained by restrictions on borrowing and short-selling risky assets.
The constraints bind on young households, who would like to consume
more and take on greater equity exposure. This means that changes in the
retirement system that reduce the tax burden on young households and
increase their equity exposure can have large welfare beneﬁts. Heterogene-
ity across demographic groups appears to have important eﬀects on opti-
mal portfolios, suggesting the inadequacy of a “one-size-ﬁts-all” social
security system.
References
Feldstein, Martin, ed. 1998. Privatizing social security. Chicago: Chicago Univer-
sity Press.
Feldstein, Martin, and J. Liebman. Forthcoming. The distributional aspects of an
investment-based social security system. In Distributional aspects of investment-
based social security reform, ed. M. Feldstein and J. Liebman. Chicago: Univer-
sity of Chicago Press.
Feldstein, Martin, and A. Samwick. 1997. The economics of prefunding so-
cial security and medicare beneﬁts. In NBER macroeconomics annual, 1997, ed.
Ben S. Bernanke and Julio Rotemberg, 115–48. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
———. 1998a. Potential eﬀects of two percent personal retirement accounts. Tax
Notes 79, no. 5 (4 May): 615–20.
———. 1998b. The transition path in privatizing social security. In Privatizing so-
cial security, ed. Martin Feldstein. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
———. 1999. Maintaining social security beneﬁts and tax rates through personal
retirement accounts: An update based on the 1998 Social Security Trustees re-
port. Working Paper no. 6540. Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau of Eco-
nomic Research, March.
Gruber, Jonathan, and D. Wise, eds. 1998. Social security and retirement around
the world: Introduction and summary. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Samuelson, Paul. 1958. An exact consumption-loan model of interest with or with-
out the social contrivance of money. Journal of Political Economy 66:467–82.
Shoven, John, ed. 2000. Administrative aspects of investment-based social security
reform. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
10 John Y. Campbell and Martin Feldstein